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Jean-Luc Nancy was born in Caudean, France, 
in 1940. In 1963, he 
graduated at the Sorbonne in Paris, having 
written his master thesis 
on Hegel's philosophy of religion. In 1973, 
he obtained his doctorate 
with a dissertation on Kant's analogical 
discourse. Although he 
published extensively on Hegel and Kant, his 
thinking is primarily 
linked to the philosophies of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Derrida. 
Indeed, 'occasionally, it is insinuated that 
Nancy is a 'French 
Nietzschean', a 'post-Heideggerian' or even a 
'Derridean'' (Hutchens 
2015, 24). However, Nancy takes their 
thinking (legacy(?)) up to its 
limits. If anything, Nancy can be considered 
a highly originary 
thinker because he endeavours to let sense 
speak for itself (Meurs, 
Devisch 2015). He uses words and sentences so 
that they stand outside 
themselves and open up to a regime of sense 
beyond their own specific 
traditional meaning. According to Morin, 
'Nancy's ideas make sense 
but this sense arises more from moving across 
sentences than from the 
internal signification of any one particular 
sentence taken into 
isolation' (Morin 2012, 2). Indeed, Nancy's 
peculiar style not only 
makes him a pioneering writer, but also helps 
him to write 
originally, thinking things anew, rephrasing 
and retracing their 
meaning. 
 
A good example of this is the work he did 
together with Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe for the Centre for 
Philosophical Research on the 
Political between 1980 and 1984 (Nancy, 
Lacoue-Labarthe 1997). In 
their texts, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 
literally try to retrace or 
re-treat the essence of the political. They 
question the space and 
meaning of what is considered the political, 
doing this in such a way 
that the political is problematided or re-
defined. Their 
deconstruction of the notion of the political 
has had a significant 
impact on key contemporary political thinkers 
such as Alain Badiou, 
Claude Lefort, Jacques Ranciere and others. 
 
Nancy has employed the same style and 
movement in his thinking on 
community (1991), religion (2008), ontology 
(2000), and more 
generally, the sense of the world (1997b, 
2007). Each time, he deals 
with conceptual assumptions and systems in 
this way, he engages with 
and pushes the limits of their originary 
meaning. 
 
The three articles contained in this issue of 
Philosophical Pathways 
focus on his contribution to political 
philosophy, each from its own 
perspective. 
 
Ignaas Devisch starts with one of Franz 
Kafka's short stories ('5+1 
is not always 6'). It is about five persons 
living together and a 
newcomer joining them later on. Devisch 
introduces the story to 
problematise what it means to belong. What is 
interesting in this 
story is that it brings to light the 
haphazard nature of the small 
community of these five persons, and by 
extension the contingency of 
any community. It also displays how these 
persons introduce a 
distinction between an inside (the community 
of five) and an outside 
(the newcomer), even if the former are dimly 
aware of the 
(previously) uncommitted nature of their 
relationships on which their 
communality is founded. 
 
Inspired by Nancy, Devisch invites us to 
rethink community, or our 
being together. While in previous times, 
community was usually 
something that was simply there and to which 
people belonged due to 
shared characteristics, today we no longer 
know how to express this 
being in common; the concept has lost its 
very meaning and so does 
our ability to organise society. In order to 
reconsider community, we 
have to understand, as the story of Kafka 
reveals, that all criteria 
to enclose a community are contingent. A 
community can never be 
closed based on essential characteristics; it 
is always incomplete 
because of its very disposition of being 
formed by singular 
individuals. Hence, incompleteness does not 
stand for a lack, but is 
constitutive of community. 
 
To grasp on a still deeper level what 
community, or collective 
identity, entails, Devisch has to show how 
Nancy's approach to 
community is inherently linked to an altered 
perception of subject or 
identity, one that is formed neither through 
collective nor through 
individual essences. Rather, its main 
characteristic is fluidity 
through time, a non-essence that is both 
singular and collective (or 
plural). What is particular about this view 
is that both terms do not 
stand next to one another, but intrinsically 
refer to one another. 
Singularity is always being with others, to 
be exposed to others and 
yet to differ from them in a non-substantial 
way. Identities (both 
collective and individual), then, are each 
time, through each 
encounter, recomposed, transformed, reshaped. 
 
This take on the communal, while requiring a 
certain amount of 
intellectual effort, opens up new and 
challenging perspectives. These 
perspectives will remain blocked from sight 
if we keep perceiving 
community from traditional standards -- 
essentialities -- that 
newcomers have to adapt to. 
 
Pieter Meurs' article is of a more abstract 
nature and investigates 
the relationship between myth and ideology, 
more particularly how 
myth enters into ideology, in order to 
briefly indicate why we are 
experiencing a loss of sense in modern times. 
 
Nancy highlights the all-pervasiveness of 
myth (e.g. religious 
stories are also mythical), because of an 
intertwinement of logos, 
community and reality. Myth presents itself 
as the prime manner of 
understanding reality, as the very language 
of the things manifesting 
themselves. It is representation itself. It 
needs no interpretation or 
explanation. As such, it founds reality, it 
reveals the reality of 
community to itself. In myth, the cosmos 
structures itself in logos, 
and logos structures itself. Myth explains 
and founds community, 
providing it with a reason to be. And yet 
myth is always an 
invention. Needing no legitimation, it turns 
its own foundation into 
fiction. 
 
For a long time, ideology did not have this 
mythical aspect but, as 
Meurs shows in Nancy's thinking, its 
totalitarian tendencies can be 
considered as an entry of myth into modern 
political thinking. As 
myths, totalitarian ideologies (including 
capitalism) are truths in 
themselves that cannot be proven wrong. 
Today, however, this 
correspondence between truth and reality has 
been seriously 
problematised. Since our representations no 
longer designate the 
objectivity of the world, we are at a loss 
about how to understand 
reality, having lost its signification. It is 
this loss of sense we 
are experiencing in modern times. 
 
Femke Kaulingfreks compares in her article 
two cases of public 
mourning entwined with political protest. 
Some time ago, in the 
United States several people of color were 
killed by the police 
(Michael Brown, Erik Garner). Here, public 
mourning is considered to 
be the expression of identification with a 
shared humanity, 
regardless of whether there was an actual 
identification with the 
victims. Recently, in France people were 
massacred in the attack on 
the staff of the satirical magazine Charlie 
Hebdo. Mourning, 
expressed under the slogan 'Je Suis Charlie' 
rather seems to 
ventilate a strong identification with 
Western liberal ideals of 
freedom of expression and creativity. 
Kaulingfreks starts from this 
distinction to question public mourning as an 
act of political 
solidarity, if drawn on an appeal to 
identification. She relies, 
amongst others, on Nancy's insights on 
freedom and subject that 
differ from the liberal interpretation, a-
being-on-my-own position 
that the autonomous subject can attain or be 
deprived of. Instead, 
freedom should be thought as the very being 
in the world with others, 
sharing existence, regardless of whether we 
acknowledge or appreciate 
the existence of these others. Being free is 
the very experience of 
coexistence, confronting us with the limits 
of autonomous, 
substantiated subjects; an ontological 
condition needing no further 
qualifications. Nancy's interpretation has 
political implications, 
indicating how the political goes beyond the 
founding of a coherent 
order amongst like-minded people. It likewise 
points to the limits of 
an established and necessary justice system, 
and the compelling force 
of protesting against injustice, in order to 
each time render justice. 
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I. 'WHY 5+1 IS NOT ALWAYS 6' BY IGNAAS 
DEVISCH 
 
1. Two short stories 
 
To introduce what is at stake in Nancy's 
work, let me start with a 
short story from Franz Kafka. A very short 
story it is, and Max Brod, 
who edited Kafka's work, entitled it 
posthumously as 'Gemeinschaft' -- 
the English translation is entitled with 
'Fellowship', a very 
questionable translation. (1983) It is a 
story of no more than 
fifteen lines about five people living 
together in a house. They were 
five friends we are told, everything was 
fine, but then a sixth wanted 
to join in and he refused to budge. The sixth 
came to disturb the 
party and throw the mathematics overboard. 
Though the friends wanted 
to include the sixth if the 5+1 would have 
become 5 again, which 
means they would still be one community, a 
whole or a totality. 
Before the sixth arrived, the five were one, 
not because they really 
enjoyed each other but they were one; they 
lived together and 
therefore they are a community; the intruder 
came to turn this order 
upside down because the 5+1 isn't actually 5 
but 6 or even more than 
that. 
 
To summarize the story: we were with five 
friends, we once came out 
of a house and people said, look, these five 
came out of this house. 
Since then, we live together and all went 
well until a sixth arrived. 
As such, we don't mind the sixth but the five 
of us are fine as it is; 
we don't know him and we don't want him. 
Although we don't know each 
other, we are used to each other now and we 
don't want to be six. 
Being with six doesn't make sense but being 
with five neither, but we 
are used to it and we don't want a new 
community. We could make strong 
statements or detailed declarations but we 
won't do that. We don't 
declare anything. The sixth keeps on coming 
and although we push him 
away, he always returns. End of the story. 
 
Kafka's short story obviously discusses the 
matter of belonging to, 
of being part of a group or a kind, of being 
included or excluded. 
While Borges explicitly mocks about the 
attempt to classify living 
beings of all kinds, Kafka discusses the 
mathematical order we are 
familiar with. Apparently, when it comes down 
to being together, 
mathematics comes in trouble. Many social 
scientists, sociologists or 
philosophers have claimed this in the past: 
people living together in 
a community generate a reality of which a 
total sum is always more 
than the parts of it. (Lopez 2003) 
Consequently, the question of 
living together is not a problem where 1 and 
1 is always 2. Kafka's 
short story poses this problem in the 
starkest terms: 5+1 isn't five 
and therefore, the sixth, the intruder by 
coincidence, is not allowed 
to enter the house, not because the five hate 
him but simply they are 
five and belong together and he's not one of 
them. If 5+1 would have 
been 5, then it would have worked, but 
apparently 5+1 will even be 
more than 6. 
 
2. Singularity 
 
Franz Kafka's tale exposes a metaphysical 
problem we want to reveal 
throughout this article. The way five friends 
leave the house is 
quite everyday scenery. It could have been 
workers leaving their 
company by the end of the day. People come 
together, fall apart, make 
agreements, cross each other in the street, 
curse one another in 
traffic, etc. To be sure, we all have more in 
common and more intense 
contact with some than with others; indeed, 
while some will strike us 
as completely strange, there may be others 
that we feel are our 
soulmates. Not all experiences are equal, or 
even important, but all 
fall within the frame of what we could 
describe as everyday 
encounters. 
 
Kafka's story is intriguing because the five 
also operate in this 
everyday mode, but nevertheless privilege one 
meeting so as to 
surmount the everydayness and attain an 
authentic existence. They 
exploit a banal meeting in order to set up a 
community to which only 
they belong, excluding everyone else. Despite 
their vague awareness 
that their community is nothing more than a 
banal meeting, they 
institute a communality where the shared 
experience of their 
contingent meeting undergoes a sort of 
process of concretization and 
seems to harden into an essence, a first 
cause or principle to 
overcome the order of contingency. They take 
this proclaimed essence 
to erect a barrier between themselves and 
others. 
 
What Kafka's story indicates so beautifully 
here is that this barrier 
is itself of the order of the contingent, so 
that the whole operation 
of marking out the community is supported a 
priori by a failure. 
Every community is also a contingent 
community but most often forgets 
this contingency in order to put up a barrier 
between the inside and 
the outside, between the members of the 
community and the intruders. 
Then community becomes an imaginary whole 
(Anderson 1999), an organic 
entity which seems to be natural in the way 
its barriers are installed. 
 
3. Community 
 
Someone who profoundly thought about the 
importance of community in 
our contemporary world is French philosopher 
Jean-Luc Nancy. 
Community, he keeps on repeating, is one of 
the major problems of our 
era. Why indeed do we have to think community 
today? Undoubtedly, the 
most obvious answer Nancy would give to the 
question is that 
community today is an issue affecting every 
kind of formal 
organization in society. 
 
It sounds rather banal to say we have to deal 
with something because 
it is a problem, but the question is of 
course why today community is 
a problem or at least a question and why we 
cannot but deal with it. 
(Nancy 1991) There were times where it was 
self-evident who belonged 
to the community and who didn't, you were 
simply born in it. You were 
inside or outside of the house. Community 
then could not be a problem 
because the question of what it means to be 
in common did not even 
arise. (Devisch 2010) Whether these periods 
were better, simpler or 
rosier is yet another, at the same time very 
necessary, question to 
be asked if we are to avoid any nostalgic 
romanticizing of times 
past; the fact is that community has not 
always been under 
discussion. In some periods, community was 
simply there, as the 
foundation and final cause of existence and 
the being of community 
was a sufficient reason for living together 
in a community. (Nancy 
1992) 
 
Obviously today, this is not the case and one 
does not have to 
consult philosophical or ethical literature 
to see that community is 
indeed a problem, or at least is being 
conceived as problematic, and 
it is thus imperative to look for an answer 
to the problems that 
present themselves in thinking through our 
times. (Macintyre 1981) 
Since having clear insight into a problem is 
just as important as 
finding an answer, the question is: which 
problems are we dealing 
with in the context of community? The most 
basic and tautological 
answer is: the problem that we no longer know 
what we are talking 
about when we talk about community. 
 
Here, too, the triviality of this answer 
speaks volumes but again, 
this is to Nancy a crucial insight in 
nowadays' society: the fact 
that we no longer know whether and how we can 
still speak about 
community, this is the fundamental challenge 
of community today. The 
most foundational evidence of a community -- 
who belongs to it and 
why -- is at loose ends and this is at least 
a challenge, not only to 
philosophy but to society as a whole. (Nancy 
2000) If every barrier of 
a community is contingent -- think about 
Borges: if every 
classification fails -- then the fundamental 
question raises how to 
organize society, since we cannot simply 
pretend that we are one 
world community and then presuppose all of 
our problems to be solved. 
 
As far as Nancy concerns, we need new words 
and concepts to think our 
being together today, because the words by 
which we thought about 
community -- community is all about sharing 
the same essence: a 
color, a race, a nature, a nationality or a 
culture -- is being 
eroded by the way society has evolved. 
(Collective MT 1991) A variety 
of cultural, political and social 
developments have led to the 
disappearance of traditional social bonds. A 
quick recounting of 
these developments would include the economic 
reduction of the 
importance of the old nation states through 
the increasing 
significance of transnational and global 
economic and cultural 
organization, rapid urbanization, greater 
complexity in terms of 
social and institutional structures and the 
progressive 
disintegration of ancient social connections 
and traditions. These 
have all contributed to the appearance of new 
insecurities and an 
increasing precariousness of our situation, 
both at the individual 
level and in the field of the social. All 
this has contributed to the 
appearance of new insecurities and created 
increasingly precarious 
situations for both individuals and society 
as a whole. 
 
Insecurities have troubling effects not only 
on a number of social 
and political structures but also on our 
personal identities. 
Consequently, one of the most important 
uncertainties of today's 
society is that the traditional social bonds 
have dissolved and that 
we are confronted with the most basic 
questions. This is if course a 
golden age for philosophers who are most 
often fond of fundamental 
questions. So is Nancy. One of his major 
books on community is called 
Being singular plural. (Nancy 2000) He argues 
that there is no 
singularity which is not plural and, the 
other way round, that there 
is no plurality which is not singular. To 
translate this into 
layman's terms: to be always implies to be 
more than one. 
 
To Nancy, the 'more than one' is crucial: 
being never means 
being-alone but always being-with. (Nancy 
2008) Although this idea 
seems the most banal oneliner since decades, 
it is crucial in many 
discussions on identity and community. It 
implies that every 
enclosure of a community will always also be 
disclosed or disturbed 
from outside because the criteria used to 
enclose it are contingent. 
There will always be a sixth. 
 
Nancy states that such insufficiency 
constitutes in principle every 
community. This must be regarded as 
fundamental, he concludes. The 
disclosure of a community is not derived from 
an originary or 
still-to-be-constituted completeness nor from 
a lack that the 
community is designed to sublate. (Nancy 
1999) Rather, such 
incompleteness is something constitutive 
because we are, be it as an 
individual person or as a collective 
identity, always exposed to 
others. For Nancy, the incompleteness is 
never located in some sort 
of quest for a closed totality. Insufficiency 
never stands for a 
lack, but for something that fundamentally 
cannot be perfected or 
finished and therefore is constitutive for 
every community. In short, 
closure goes hand in hand with disclosure and 
this challenges 
profoundly our thinking of identities. 
 
Next to the incompleteness, a second 
characteristic Nancy puts 
forward is what he calls the singular 
character of identities. (Nancy 
2000) Singularity is not an easy concept. It 
refers to something that 
is rather ungraspable and unique, something 
hasty or fluid. These 
are, of course, no characteristics that will 
lead us towards a 
substance or essence of a society. It rather 
appears to be the other 
way round: the lack of any essence seems to 
be the only essence of 
singularity. (Nancy 1992b) 
 
Singularity represents the idea of a temporal 
identity, a 
non-substantial given changing all the time 
while existence goes on. 
In yet another text of Nancy, The Experience 
of Freedom, we find an 
interesting passage that might help us to 
answer this dilemma: 
 
     For us, existence is above all what is 
singular. It happens 
     singularly and only singularly. As for 
the existence, its 
     own existence is above all singular, 
which means that its 
     existence is not precisely its 'own' and 
that its 
     'existing' happens an indefinite number 
of times 'in' its 
     very individuality (which is for its 
part a singularity). 
     Singularity is what distinguishes the 
existent from the 
     subject, for the subject is essentially 
what appropriates 
     itself, according to its own proximity 
and law. Yet the 
     advent of a subjectivity is itself a 
singularity. 
     (Nancy 1993) 
 
To accentuate the non-essential and temporary 
character of our 
identity as an individual or as part of a 
collective, not only Nancy 
but a lot of contemporary continental 
thinkers have used the notion 
of singularity. Many of them are or have been 
looking for a suitable 
concept to think identity in a non-
substantial or non-essential way. 
Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles 
Deleuze, to mention just 
a few names, have tried to make progress in 
thinking our identity in 
this way. (Agamben 1990, May 1997, Patton 
1996, Derrida 1997, 1988) 
Most of them have an almost inborn fear from 
the political, 
philosophical, and social claim that identity 
can be seen as 
something that one owns. This does not only 
hold for an individual 
essence but also, and perhaps more urgently, 
for essences that 
believed to be shared collectively. Twentieth 
century politics have 
shown all too clear where the claim on closed 
substantial identities 
might lead to. Therefore, all of the thinkers 
named (and others), 
want to undo the possibility of this claim by 
thinking identity or 
existence in another way, in order to prevent 
us from totalitarian 
thinking. (Traverso 2001) 
 
While many thinkers put forward a strong 
individual identity against 
the risk of totalitarian collectivities, 
Nancy's specific touch in 
this debate is the explicit relation he 
establishes between 
singularity and plurality. He argues that 
there is no singularity 
which is not plural and, the other way round, 
that there is no 
plurality which is not singular: being is 
always being-with, singular 
is always singular plural, being one is 
always being more than one. 
The singularity is a plurality, with and 
between other singularities 
(which are, by the same token, also 
pluralities). Nancy speaks of the 
'singular plural' in such a way as to make 
clear that singularity is 
inextricably bound up with plurality. 
Singularity is being-with-many. 
(Nancy 2000, 2008) 
 
To singularize oneself means to be exposed to 
others and to differ 
from others. The relation between 
singularities is their 
incommensurability. They can never be reduced 
to one another, but 
their mutual differences never boil down to 
substantial 
characteristics which can lead towards the 
closure of a collective of 
similar singularities. We are different from 
one another, but not out 
of a substance or archetype. Characteristics 
like ethnicity or 
culture are contingent, in a way that they 
are not the exclusive and 
substantial key terms to include or exclude a 
person to a certain 
community. Admittedly, there are Germans and 
others who are not, 
there are laborers and others who are not, or 
there are Muslims and 
others who are not, but here Nancy crucially 
points out these people 
do not differ in a substantial way from the 
others since there is no 
infinite and everlasting native essence 
called 'German', 'laborer', 
or 'Muslim'. Because of their 
singularisation, identities differ from 
themselves and can no longer be thought of as 
a substance to which 
one, depending on whether one shares the 
putative essence of the 
collective identity, belongs or not. 
Identities, be it collectives or 
individuals, are contingent in a way that 
they change with every 
singularization. Each time again, they are 
recomposed, rebuild, and 
modified. Not that they are just like 
anything or anyone else. They 
are a 'self' but this self is only in its 
respective singular moments 
each time again different from the other 
moments. (Nancy 2008) 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Kafka's story in which the five conceived 
themselves as one and the 
sixth represented their 'more than one' 
reveals the starting point 
Nancy stands upon in his writings on 
community and singularity and 
the way he develops a new thought on 
individual or collective 
identity. Identity, he claims, is no vast and 
steady entity, 
grounding itself. Neither is a collective, 
thought out in terms of a 
substantial criterion that allegedly marks 
the frontier between inner 
and outer. Both the individual and the 
collective exist in their 
respective singularization. They change all 
the time and so do their 
characteristics. 
 
Thinking changing identities is as such not 
innovative -- of course, 
we change all the time -- but it gets 
radicalized in Nancy's thought. 
Nancy does not start with the essence of an 
identity which then is 
subject to some changes. It is just the other 
way round: identity is 
nothing but the gathering of singular 
differences, the 
infra-individual differences that make 
someone always plurally, 
locally and momentarily different. 
 
Existence is without essence and that is what 
Nancy's singularity is 
all about. If we all are singular and thus 
plural, we neither do have 
an essence nor are we substantial 
individuals: 
 
     At this exact point, then, one becomes 
most aware of the 
     essence of singularity: it is not 
individuality; it is, 
     each time, the punctuality of a 'with' 
that establishes a 
     certain origin of meaning and connects 
it to an infinity of 
     other possible origins. Therefore, it 
is, at one and the 
     same time, infra-/ intra-individual and 
transindividual, and 
     always the two together. The individual 
is an intersection 
     of singularities, the discrete 
exposition of their 
     simultaneity, an exposition that is both 
discrete and 
     transitory. (Nancy 2000) 
 
Consequently, we do not differ just from 
others but also continuously 
from ourselves. With a friend we behave 
differently than with family. 
In different contexts we can also behave 
differently toward the same 
person. People never meet person Y as such, 
but always person Y with 
specific infra-individual qualities or 
characteristics. This is why 
people are not to be distinguished from each 
other on the basis of 
whether or not they share a common 
denominator. There are no 
archetypal points of comparison or one or 
another essence against 
which each character trait can be measured. 
The smile of an African 
girl does not typify the girl on the basis of 
some substantial 
characteristics of either being black or 
African. The smile typifies 
the girl at that moment, at that fleeting 
moment at which she laughs. 
Each new situation brings another smile (or 
tear) and thus another 
origin or singular moment. (Nancy 2008) 
 
This seems superficial but it implies a lot. 
As long as we start from 
identity as a substantial given, an 
unfruitful opposition is at work: 
the collective is seen as the enemy of the 
subject and vice versa. 
From this perspective, individuals should 
adapt to enter the identity 
and if not, they remain an intruder, an 
outsider. ... 
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II. 'JEAN-LUC NANCY, MYTH, IDEOLOGY' BY 
PIETER MEURS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a footnote of his La Communaute 
Desoeuvree, Jean Luc Nancy writes 
that it is necessary to investigate more 
closely the entry of myth 
into modern political thinking and more 
generally the relationship 
between myth and ideology (Nancy 1990, 116n). 
In this paper, I will 
explore the way in which we should understand 
this strange relation 
between myth and ideology. To do so, I will 
first briefly outline 
Nancy's now already known thinking of myth. 
Secondly, I will 
introduce a modern understanding of ideology. 
In a concluding remark, 
I will discuss Nancy's idea of the entry of 
myth in ideology. 
 
2. Myth 
 
In La communaute desoeuvree, Nancy discusses 
myth within the context 
of community. We all know myth as a narrative 
that tells of the 
beginning of times or of the reason for 
something. It is a specific 
set of understandings that shows why things 
are the way they are and 
why people do the things they do. According 
to Nancy, a myth 
functions not merely as a metaphysical 
principle for a community: not 
only does it provide a community with an 
explanation for its 
existence, it also guarantees its foundation 
and continuation. It is 
a language that is 'the element of an 
inaugural communication in 
which exchange and sharing in general are 
founded or inscribed' 
(Nancy 1991, 48). Let us analyse this 
sentence in order to grasp its 
full potential. First of all, Nancy considers 
myth to be full, 
original speech. It is not a discourse that 
needs to be argued in 
order to be legitimate. Rather, myth provides 
the legitimation of 
arguments itself. It informs us of how we do 
things, not why we do 
them. Myth refers to a (mostly implicit) set 
of understandings by 
which we encounter the reality of our 
community. As such, it needs no 
explanation but is itself the explanation: 
'it does not need to be 
interpreted, since it explains itself' 
(Ibid., 49). Drawing on 
Schelling, Nancy would say that myth is 
'tautegorical': it simply 
communicates nothing other than itself. Myth 
presents itself as the 
initial or prime language that allows us to 
understand our reality. 
Or even better: that provides us with an 
understanding of that 
reality. As a consequence, according to 
Nancy, myth is reality 
communicating itself: it is the interplay 
between the practical and 
the theoretical. 'It is the speech and the 
language of the very 
things that manifest themselves, it is the 
communication of these 
things: it does not speak of the appearance 
or the aspect of things; 
rather, in myth, their rhythm speaks and 
their music sounds' (Ibid., 
50). In this regard, myth and community 
necessarily belong to each 
other. It is impossible to grasp the 
existence of our community 
outside myth. 'Myth arises only from a 
community and for it: they 
engender one another, infinitely and 
immediately' (Ibid., 50). 
According to Nancy, myth, as a system of 
meaning, as our regime of 
sense, tells us what a community is about. It 
explains our reality. 
Or in other words: community reveals itself 
by means of, or, in myth. 
Simultaneously, however, in this revealing, 
myth also legitimates or 
founds community. Myth is not simply a, or 
rather: the, explanation 
of our reality, but it also provides this 
reality with a raison 
d'etre, a ground of existence. That myth 
explains reality, while 
being the explanation itself, means that it 
founds reality. As 
foundation, myth is figurative for reality 
only insofar as it is 
figuration itself. In other words, myth 
offers us a representation of 
reality, not because this would refer to a 
certain truth, but because 
it is representation itself. As such, it 
inscribes itself into the 
reality of community: 'at the same time as 
each one of its 
revelations, it also reveals the community to 
itself and founds it' 
(Ibid., 50-51). 
 
In a sense then, myth is 'the name for logos 
structuring itself, or, 
and this comes down to the same thing, the 
name for the cosmos 
structuring itself in logos' (Ibid., 49). 
According to Nancy, we can 
only understand our reality through myth. It 
is proclaimed through 
(or presented by) myth, and in this 
proclamation our reality 
communicates its myth. In short: myth is 
simultaneously 
interpretational and foundational. It offers 
an original, inaugural 
frame of reference that inscribes itself into 
the real and through 
which our reality makes sense. Consequently, 
myth is no innocent 
story. It refers to the specific interplay 
between our practices and 
theories. Myth refers to that story through 
which we live, know and 
act. The Nancean account of myth deals with 
the reciprocal interplay 
between the physical and the meta-physical. 
It expresses the fact 
that a description is never independent of 
its reality, that it is 
intimately linked to a certain normative or 
prescriptive content. 
Myth not only offers a description and an 
explanation of reality, it 
also provides it with meaning, with a 
direction. 
 
So far, Nancy has explained myth as a 
narrative or an imaginary that 
offers us an explanation of reality, while at 
the same time founding 
it. We should understand myth from its mythic 
(or mything) power. 
What Nancy teaches us in a genuine 
comprehensive way, though, is not 
only how this myth relates to the world, but 
also to itself: he 
indicates that myth always already is a myth 
as well. This seemingly 
tautologic sentence 'means in effect that 
myth, as inauguration or as 
foundation, is a myth, in other words, a 
fiction, a simple invention' 
(Ibid., 52). Although a myth is an 
interpretational matrix that gives 
meaning -- and as such, direction -- to 
everyday practices, it is, at 
the same time, a simple fiction as well. 
Nancy thus combines two 
quite distinct and opposite meanings of the 
word myth. He argues, in 
this respect, that we should not understand 
myth from one of these 
meanings (on the one hand: that it is a 
fiction, on the other: that 
it is a foundation), but from their internal 
tension. He considers 
myth as a foundation by fiction, or as a 
founding fiction. This has 
everything to do with the fact that myth is 
self-communicating, 
self-explaining. It needs no legitimation: it 
is legitimation or 
explanation itself. As a consequence, myth 
turns its own fiction into 
foundation. 
 
The power of Nancy's thinking of myth lies in 
the idea that myth is 
simultaneously myth and foundation. Not only 
is it a critical account 
to understand myth, but it also offers a 
critical way to investigate 
our modern situation. In order to do so, we 
first have to explore the 
meaning of ideology. 
 
3. Ideology 
 
So far, 'nobody has yet come up with a single 
adequate definition of 
ideology' (Eagleton 1991, 1). It is however a 
'word that evokes 
strong emotional responses' (Freeden 2003b, 
1). This has everything 
to do with the way in which Marx and Engels 
(1998) have influenced 
the understanding of the concept. Their work 
has engendered the 
common conception of ideology (as a 
smokescreen) that is still 
influential today. However, as much as the 
contemporary scholarship 
is indebted to the Marxist concept of 
ideology, it also criticizes 
its pejorative connotation. Geertz aptly 
summarized this critique 
stating that 'the term 'ideology' has itself 
become thoroughly 
ideologized' (Geertz 1973, 193). For a long 
time, ideology referred 
to dogmatic, doctrinaire and closed systems 
of thought that needed to 
be overcome. With Althusser (1969), ideology 
was regarded more and 
more as the hidden element of specific 
representations and 
significations. In this view, ideology is no 
longer considered as 
something that needs to be overcome, but is a 
necessary permanent and 
organic part of social totality. Althusser 
argued that 'ideology is 
not an aberration or a contingent excrescence 
of History: it is a 
structure essential to the historical life of 
societies' (Althusser 
1969, 232). Ideologies are a fundamental part 
of social practices. 
Rather than to false understanding of 
reality, ideology refers to 
understanding pure and simple. It is a 
structure by which we know the 
world. And this understanding is not solely a 
conscious act. In this 
sense, Althusser indicated that 'ideology is 
indeed a system of 
representations, but in the majority of cases 
these representations 
have nothing to do with 'consciousness': they 
are usually images and 
occasionally concepts, but it is above all as 
structures that they 
impose on the vast majority of men, not via 
their 'consciousness'' 
(Althusser 1969, 233). In this regard, 
ideology has a 
practico-socio-political function: we live or 
experience 
socio-political reality by means of ideology. 
It is a representation 
of the relation between men and their world. 
 
Thus, contrary to the Marxist understanding 
of ideology, more recent 
studies in the first place question the 
ephemerality and the 
deceptive aspect of ideology. Ideology is no 
longer a smokescreen 
that blocks true consciousness and as such 
should be overcome. 
Rather, it is considered as something 
permanent that offers a 
possibility to understand reality. In this 
sense, Freeden (1996) is 
right that it would be more correct to speak 
about ideologies 
(plural), instead of ideology. Instead of 
referring to one 
predominant and deceptive way of 
understanding the world, ideology, 
or rather: ideologies, are considered as 
various 'sets of ideas by 
which men posit, explain and justify ends and 
means of organized 
social action, and specifically political 
action, irrespective of 
whether such action aims to preserve, amend, 
uproot or rebuild a 
given social order' (Seliger 1976, 11). It is 
neither good nor bad, 
true nor false, liberating nor oppressive. 
Ideologies are narratives 
that inform us about our relation to the 
world. In this regard, 
ideology has been presented as an ordered 
system of cultural symbols: 
it provides authoritative concepts to render 
practices meaningful 
(Geertz 1973)[1]. 
 
Ideology, in this generic inclusive 
conception, is considered as a 
system of beliefs, a set of moral and 
political understandings that 
gives an explanation and legitimation and 
proposes a specific 
direction of the world. Now we know what 
ideologies are, we have to 
understand how they work. In this, we should 
read the word literally: 
ideology is an (not necessary conscious) 
understanding (logos) of the 
world by means of conceptual and ideal images 
(idea). It is Hannah 
Arendt's critical account of ideology that is 
very insightful in this 
sense.[2] In her The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, she defines ideology 
quite literally as 'the logic of an idea' 
(Arendt 1962, 469). She 
argues that ideology revolves around the 
application of an idea to 
history in such a way that the course of 
events is explained by the 
idea as one consistent process. It means that 
'whatever happens, 
happens according to the logic of one 'idea'' 
(Arendt 1962, 469). The 
idea becomes the foundation for the way in 
which the world should be 
ordered. It offers the premise and 
explanation for everything.[3] 
 
According to Arendt, this form of idealism at 
the basis of an 
ideology implies that every ideology 
inherently contains totalitarian 
aspects. She discerns three totalitarian 
elements that are 
characteristic to ideological thinking. The 
first concerns the idea 
that ideology offers a total explanation for 
the movement of history, 
in the sense that it justifies what becomes, 
has passed away and is to 
be born. This 'claim of total explanation 
promises to explain all 
historical happenings, the total explanation 
of the past, the total 
knowledge of the present, and the reliable 
prediction of the future' 
(Arendt 1962, 470). Secondly, in order to 
fulfil this promise, an 
ideology needs to elevate itself to something 
that stands beyond 
ephemeral reality: 'ideological thinking 
becomes emancipated from the 
reality that we perceive with our five 
senses, and insists on a 
'truer' reality concealed behind all 
perceptible things, dominating 
them from this place of concealment and 
requiring a sixth sense that 
enables us to become aware of it' (Arendt 
1962, 470-471). The third 
totalitarian element is to be found in the 
foundation for this 
emancipation: an ideology's idea functions as 
its axiomatic premise 
or ground from which everything else is a 
logical consequence. 
Ideologies are thus always a kind of logical 
deduction, corresponding 
to the two aforementioned elements. Firstly, 
'because its thought 
movement does not spring from experience but 
is self-generated, and, 
secondly, because it transforms the one and 
only point that is taken 
and accepted from experienced reality into an 
axiomatic premise, 
leaving from then on the subsequent 
argumentation process completely 
untouched from further experience' (Arendt 
1962, 471). 
 
In a sense then, the totalitarian elements of 
an ideology seek to 
objectify its narrative. They try to exempt a 
space from speculation 
as a place where the ideology's core concepts 
can be presented as an 
absolute and final ground. Ideologies hold on 
to the realism of the 
idea. As a consequence, the explanation or 
understanding about the 
world that an ideology offers becomes nearly 
indisputable, almost 
god-given. The logic of ideas presupposes the 
steady ground of its 
own logic. In this sense, ideology claims its 
logic of the idea to be 
true: it offers a steady ground to found its 
political community upon. 
It withdraws ideology from being a mere 
narrative and legitimates the 
claim of its veracity. 
 
4. Myth's entry in ideology 
 
At this point, it is possible to connect myth 
and ideology. According 
to Nancy: the totalitarian tendencies of an 
ideology indicate the 
entrance of myth into modern political 
thinking (Nancy 1990, 
116n).[4] Myth's entry into ideology, implies 
first of all that an 
ideology is believed to be an original, true 
narrative. It becomes 
the truth of the world. This is the case 
since the foundational idea 
of ideology is considered as self-evident, a 
truth in itself. In a 
sense, then, ideology works by means of its 
mythological structure. 
In other words, the mythological background 
of ideology implies that 
ideology legitimates itself: by means of the 
logic of its ideas. It 
needs no legitimation for it is legitimation 
itself. Or, as Nancy 
would say: 'it is self-communicating' (Nancy 
1991, 50). The entry of 
myth into ideologies explains the dissolving 
of a transcendent 
vantage point into the immanence of a logic 
of ideas. The political 
narrative becomes the truth, not because it 
refers to a vantage point 
that assures its truth, but 'simply because'. 
It is claimed to be true 
in itself. In other words, mythic ideology, 
becomes the authentic tale 
of the world. As a consequence, it cannot be 
simply proven 'wrong' by 
any other political narrative, because such 
another narrative could 
never claim absolute truth itself. Indeed, 
the entry of myth into 
political thought implies that this thought 
and its political outline 
cannot be easily inverted. The ideas that 
form the ground of an 
ideology are no longer simple ideas: they are 
total, global. They are 
no longer ideas that can be discredited or 
fought. 
 
At the same time however, it is evermore 
apparent that today, the 
mythic status of ideology can no longer be 
claimed. Indeed, 'we no 
longer live in mythic life, nor in a time of 
mythic invention or 
speech' (Nancy 1991, 52). Our speech and 
ideas no longer refer to the 
inaugural communication in which exchange and 
sharing in general are 
founded or inscribed. They are no longer 
original. Due to the 
contemporary crisis of sense, words have lost 
their originary 
significance. They are no longer the 
communication of reality itself. 
Put otherwise: words or concepts do not 
simply equate things. Together 
with philosophers like Lyotard, Derrida, 
Nietzsche, and others, Nancy 
wants to debunk the realism of the idea that 
has been present in the 
Western tradition (Meurs et al 2009). Words 
are mere words or 
representations, they are not the real as 
such. Our representations 
don't denote the objectivity of the world 
around us. And as such, we 
are not sure anymore what reality signifies. 
It is in this sense, the 
loss of sense we experience in modern times, 
refers to the loss of 
signification due to the collapse of a direct 
and objective relation 
between the real and our concepts. We have 
lost the significance of 
things. We do not live in myth anymore. 
 
From a critical point of view, Nancy's 
account of myth and its entry 
into modern political thought, reveals the 
mythical character of the 
contemporary political narratives. It shows 
that ideologies, while 
claiming to offer a steady ground for 
society, cannot invoke such a 
foundation. 
 
Footnotes 
 
1. Eagleton (1991, 28) even considers to 
equate ideology with culture. 
 
2. I am indebted to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Jean-Luc Nancy's 
apprehensive use of Arendt's analysis of 
ideology in their Le Myth 
Nazi (2005). 
 
3. Indeed, in this sense, Arendt is right to 
claim that 'not before 
Hitler and Stalin were the great political 
potentialities of 
ideologies discovered' (Arendt, 1962, 468) 
 
4. For a critical analysis of the 
modernization of myth, see 
Edelstein (2007). Basing himself on the works 
of Sorel, Edelstein 
argues that in order for a myth to enter into 
modern politics, it is 
crucial that it does not draw on the 
authority from the past, as 
classical myth would, but that it is aimed at 
future accomplishments. 
'This temporal reversal affects a second 
traditional characteristic of 
myths: whereas myths were commonly defined by 
their narratives -- 
Plato calls them 'old world stories' in the 
Timaeus -- their modern 
incarnations appear much more static, iconic 
even, as though paused 
on a single image-frame' (Edelstein, 2007, 
33). 
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III. 'CECI N'EST PAS LA SOLIDARITE: ON PUBLIC 
MOURNING, 
IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY' BY 
FEMKE KAULINGFREKS 
 
Over the past months two widely attended 
cases of public mourning 
took place. In the United States many mourned 
the death of Michael 
Brown, Eric Garner and other people of color 
who were killed by the 
police. In France people mourned the thirteen 
who were killed in the 
terrorist attack on satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo. In both cases 
public mourning was entwined with political 
protest. Masses of people 
went out in the streets to express their 
grievances for the lives 
lost, but also to protest certain unwanted 
developments in society. 
Despite the fact that both cases are of a 
very different nature, 
caused by different events and stirring 
different emotions, I wish to 
compare them here in one respect. A 
comparison between both cases 
enables me to investigate what role 
recognition on the basis of 
identity plays in the active performance of 
political solidarity, and 
how solidarity without identification could 
be expressed. 
 
1. To identify or not to identify? 
 
In the case of public mourning in the US, the 
slogan accompanying the 
protests, 'Black lives matter', represents a 
denunciation of the 
unequal valuation of different lives by state 
authorities. The 
protests voice a demand not only to end 
racial profiling by the 
police, but to end all forms of structural 
racism which are embedded 
in the American justice system. Contrary to 
the current situation in 
which people of color are not protected by 
law enforcement like white 
people, this slogan implies a prescriptive 
claim; black lives should 
equally matter in general. The expressions of 
public mourning in this 
case seemed to be based on the emphasis of a 
generic, shared humanity, 
regardless of an actual identification of the 
protesters with the 
victims who lost their lives. Not only people 
of color took the 
streets. White people marched in solidarity, 
not because they 
identified with the victims, or suffered 
themselves from police 
brutality, but because they criticized the 
prevailing societal 
structures which make justice more easily 
accessible to some than to 
others. The message was: it does not matter 
what you look like, 
everyone should be treated with care and 
respect by the police. This 
generic claim to a shared humanity was 
expressed in a more specific 
slogan, in order to clearly indicate and 
denounce who is not yet 
counted as an equally valuable human being. 
As Judith Butler 
expressed it: 
 
     If we jump too quickly to the universal 
formulation, 'all 
     lives matter,' then we miss the fact 
that black people have 
     not yet been included in the idea of 
'all lives.' That said, 
     it is true that all lives matter (we can 
then debate about 
     when life begins or ends). But to make 
that universal 
     formulation concrete, to make that into 
a living 
     formulation, one that truly extends to 
all people, we have 
     to foreground those lives that are not 
mattering now, to 
     mark that exclusion, and militate 
against it.[1] 
 
The case of public mourning in France showed 
a different relation 
between identification and political 
solidarity. Immediately after 
the terrorist attacks took place people 
gathered in the center of 
Paris and other major French cities, under 
the slogan 'Je Suis 
Charlie'. This slogan seemed to indicate a 
strong identification with 
the deceased editors of the magazine, who 
became the impersonated 
symbols of Western, liberal freedom of 
expression and creativity, 
frankly mocking any authority of church and 
state. The slogan also 
immediately lead to critique. People 
discussed whether they could 
claim to be Charlie or not, with some not 
recognizing the offensive 
tone of the magazine, and others rather 
identifying with Achmed, the 
Muslim police officer, who was also killed in 
the attack. As a 
result, the protests encouraged people to 
choose sides between 
different camps. Especially Muslims were 
expected to identify 
themselves with the treasured liberal values 
of Western society, and 
explicitly denounce violent atrocities 
committed in the name of 
Islamic faith. In this case, the expressions 
of public mourning led 
to a reaffirmation of the already often 
invoked distinctions between 
so called progressive, secular Europeans and 
backwards, dogmatic, 
Muslims. In the mourning of the attack on 
Charlie Hebdo it became 
clear how easily people are both mobilized 
and divided by claims of 
identity politics. The emphasis on 
identification as a basis for 
political solidarity in this case, seemed to 
imply that one can only 
stand up for certain ideals if one feels 
personally affected by them. 
The protests under the slogan 'Je Suis 
Charlie' did not have an 
inclusive effect, but rather stressed already 
existing boundaries 
between dominant and stigmatized groups in 
Western European societies. 
 
In what follows, I will make use of the work 
of philosopher Jean-Luc 
Nancy to problematize the performance of 
political solidarity on the 
basis of an appeal to identification. I will 
refer to his basic 
political-ontological ideas, and his writings 
on justice and freedom, 
in order to further analyse the cases of 
public mourning in France and 
the US. An engagement with his work will 
clarify that political 
solidarity based on the proposition 'I am...' 
could imply a form of 
inappropriate appropriation, because it 
presupposes that people can 
only support each other if they are the same, 
or could at least 
pretend to be the same. When people express 
their solidarity while 
saying 'I am...', this implies that they 
fully project their own 
perspective on the events, even if their 
personal experiences are not 
at all related. The awareness that some are 
privileged and others are 
not, and some identities are preferred while 
others are repressed is 
clouded by this kind of appropriation. 
Nancy's philosophy enables an 
imagination of political solidarity which 
emerges in full recognition 
of irreducible otherness, and simultaneously 
in a recognition of a 
shared embeddedness in the same society. 
Solidarity should not only 
emerge in a situation in which we can 
appropriate the suffering of 
others as our own, where we can say 'this 
could have been us, this 
could have happened to us'. It should also 
emerge in situations in 
which we cannot personally relate to the 
suffering which takes place, 
but nevertheless we make an appeal to stop 
the suffering of others. 
 
2. I am 
 
After the terrorist attacks took place in 
Paris people immediately 
felt the need to come together in public and 
collectively share their 
fear, disgust and grief about the terrible 
events. The following days 
marches were organized, not only to 
commemorate the victims, but also 
to protest attacks on the secular, liberal 
culture of Western Europe. 
The public mourning went hand in hand with 
political statements about 
the need to safeguard a public climate in 
which different, often 
opposing, and sometimes harsh and offensive 
opinions can be freely 
voiced. People held up pencils and front 
covers of the magazine 
Charlie Hebdo, stating the importance to 
defend freedom of speech and 
press against fundamentalist Islamic beliefs. 
The slogan 'Je suis 
Charlie' fits well in this liberal tradition 
and its conception of 
freedom. Freedom is a core principle of 
liberalism. It enables the 
self-chosen development of the individual, 
independent from doctrines 
or the influence of others. Restrictions of 
this personal freedom 
through coercion by authoritative forces 
related to the state, the 
church, or the community are only acceptable 
in case of a very 
compelling justification. In the contemporary 
culture of 
neoliberalism, this focus on individual self-
determination is coupled 
with a belief in the free and unrestricted 
pursuit of economic 
interests. The gaining of individual success 
and profit is 
stimulated, and in a society driven by 
competition personal interests 
are seen as a primary motivation in both 
social and political life. 
The invocation of the 'I am' in the 'Je suis 
Charlie' slogan could be 
seen as a symbol of this dominant neo-liberal 
strive for individual, 
self-realization. The slogan expresses a form 
of solidarity which is 
based on a sense of personal identification, 
reflecting the idea that 
only the freedoms to which we feel personally 
attached are worthy to 
take action for. In addition, the slogan 
seems to appeal to self 
interest as a motivation to express political 
solidarity. Currently 
we seem to live in a time in which people no 
longer take the streets 
because they wish to express solidarity with 
the marginalized or 
excluded. Political ideals seem to be only 
inspirational if they 
relate to ones personal wellbeing. If ones 
individual freedom is 
threatened, this seems to be the strongest 
incentive to take action. 
 
3. Ontological freedom 
 
Already at the end of the '80's of last 
century Jean-Luc Nancy stated 
that we are predominantly occupied with the 
concept of freedom in a 
negative sense (1993). We are mostly 
concerned with any kind of 
'evil' which could 'threaten or destroy the 
freedoms most frequently 
described by the epithet 'democratic' (ibid., 
2). This sentiment 
became explicitly apparent in the reactions 
on the terrorist attacks 
in Paris. It seems completely self-evident 
that we need to defend our 
freedom and its uncontested relation to the 
Western, liberal, 
democratic notion of the free will. Nancy 
observes this as a curious 
obsession, since one seems less eager to 
thoroughly think about the 
essential meaning of the notion of freedom. 
If we do not think 
through the meaning of freedom, we fail to 
notice that a specifically 
liberal interpretation of freedom may impede 
or disqualify other 
interpretations of freedom. In the case of 'I 
am Charlie', the slogan 
does not leave much room to reflect on the 
interests and freedom of 
those who are not Charlie, or refuse to 
identify with Charlie. In 
this sense, the slogan invites a solidarity 
which is limited to only 
one category of European citizens, of the 
ones who can identify with 
an image of liberal and secular Western 
civilization. The freedom 
which is defended under the slogan 'I am 
Charlie' can hence also lead 
to a form of repression. It seems to be 
forgotten that the stimulation 
of one persons freedom can easily lead to 
restrictions on someone 
elses freedom. Jean-Luc Nancy states in his 
book 'The Experience of 
Freedom' that freedom can only be enjoyed in 
relation to other, and 
therefore never implies a form of full 
autonomy (ibid.). This 
relation leads to an inevitable vulnerability 
for the boundaries 
which others can set to ones freedom. 
 
This thought is in line with the ontology 
Nancy has developed in his 
other work. Nancy emphasizes that every 
subject always immediately 
appears within a relation, and is therefore 
not characterized by a 
purely singular, autonomous substantiality 
forming its identity. 
Simultaneously, the subject is also not 
absorbed in a plural entity 
(e.g. 'society,' 'people,' 'class') that 
would give it a collective 
substantiality forming an identity. For 
Nancy, the interconnectedness 
between singularity and plurality 
characterizes every form of being; 
the singular is always already plural, the 
plural is always already 
singular. Nancy therefore speaks of a 
singular-plural being (2000). 
The singular-plural being is itself an 
irreducible relation that 
cannot be traced back to an initial entity. 
'Being cannot be anything 
but being-with-one-another, circulating in 
the with and as the with of 
this singularly plural coexistence.' (ibid., 
3). The 'with' is 
therefore at the core of being itself. Being-
with others is not a 
relation which is added up to an autonomous 
state of being-by itself, 
as the origin of being often tends to be 
understood according to Nancy 
(ibid., 30-31). Subjectivity should therefore 
not be understood in the 
Carthesian sense. 'The singular is an ego 
that is not a 'subject' in 
the sense of the relation of a self to 
itself' (ibid., 32-33). We do 
not become a subject when we become aware of 
ourselves in a solipsist 
way, but rather when we experience something 
'other' than ourselves. 
 
For Nancy freedom and being are inextricably 
intertwined with each 
other at an ontological level. Like being 
itself, freedom always 
implies a relation with something other, and 
is therefore always 
shared. Freedom simultaneously emerges with 
being in the world. 
Freedom is therefore in essence not something 
which needs to be 
gained because it is lost, or which needs to 
be defended as a scarce 
good (1993, 13). Freedom is always already 
there, as part of 
existence itself. This 'freedom of existence' 
should not be seen as a 
substantial thing in itself, as a defined 
substance (ibid. 55), but 
rather as a very basic ontological condition, 
which does not need to 
be further qualified. Nancy speaks of freedom 
as an 'ontological 
imperative' (p. 155), but without 
commandment. Freedom is therefore 
also not something which can be possessed or 
acquired by a subject, 
but is rather a feature of subject formation 
itself. Nevertheless, 
'freedom cannot be presented as the autonomy 
of a subjectivity in 
charge of itself and of its decisions, 
evolving freely and in perfect 
independence from every obstacle' (ibid., 
66). Since freedom 
immediately emerges with every existence in 
the world, it is also 
freedom which enables sharing, coexistence 
and relations. We are 
never completely free in the sense that we 
are on our own, as an 
autonomous self. Being free always 
immediately implies sharing the 
world with others, and sharing an awareness 
of being in the world 
with others. For Nancy, this realization 
implies that freedom cannot 
be seen separately from equality (ibid. p. 
71). We are in the world 
together with others, who are equal beings in 
the world, equally 
sharing existence with us, regardless of the 
fact whether we 
recognize their right to existence, or 
whether we positively value 
their existence. They are there, like we are, 
and therefore they are 
equally part of the same world. 
 
4. Politics at a threshold 
 
This experience of coexistence, which always 
confronts us with the 
limits of an autonomously operating, 
substantial subject with a 
strongly defined identity, has political 
implications. The political 
in Nancy's interpretation is not based on a 
shared organization, 
program or identity which brings individuals 
together in a collective 
body, but on the understanding that we 
necessarily coexist with others 
with whom we share no necessary similarities. 
A strong identification, 
such as in the case of the 'I am Charlie' 
protests, is not a 
prerequisite for political solidarity 
according to Nancy. It might 
even create unnecessary boundaries between 
those who can identify 
with each other, and 'outsiders' who are 
denied a similarly valuable 
human status. What we share on a basic 
ontological level, is first of 
all a lack of a substantive identity. 
Consequentially, the political 
is not about the establishment of a coherent 
order amongst 
like-minded people. The drawing of horizons, 
boundaries or frontiers, 
which create a division between a familiar 
whole and its strange 
outside, should instead be questioned. Jean-
Christophe Bailly speaks 
in a joint publication with Nancy of a 
thinking of the political as a 
thinking of thresholds instead of boundaries 
(Nancy & Bailly 1991, 
20). In his interpretation, a threshold does 
not divide the 
community, but rather creates a connection of 
co-appearance 
(comparution), which at the same time does 
not negate the initial 
differences that exist within each community. 
A threshold is not a 
strict barrier which separates a homogeneous 
entity from its outside; 
instead, it is the place which indicates the 
difference between inside 
and outside and which at the same time 
invites one to pass from one 
dimension into the other. The idea of the 
threshold marks the 
necessary connection between any inner and 
outside space. The 
threshold opens the inside to the outside and 
the other way around. 
 
Superficial, binary judgments between a 
certain sameness, or 
similarity which is good, and an alterity 
which is evil, can be 
contested from an awareness of our 
irreducible coexistence in the 
world. The symbolic distinctions which are 
made on the basis of the 
'I am Charlie' slogan, between good and 
civilized Western citizens 
and evil, barbaric Muslims are an example of 
such binary judgments. 
Political solidarity should not imply an 
enforcement of such 
judgements, but rather challenge a seemingly 
self-evident reference 
to fixed identity positions. Political 
solidarity could also be based 
on an affirmation of the equality of all in 
an irreducible difference. 
This Nancyean understanding of political 
solidarity comes more to 
light in the 'Black lives matter' protests in 
the US. 
 
5. Lives that matter 
 
After the death of eighteen year old Michael 
Brown, who was shot by a 
police officer while he was unarmed, people 
took the streets in 
Ferguson, and later all over the USA. A 
variety of protest forms 
emerged, which became to symbolize a 
generally shared outrage about 
the unjust treatment of people of color by 
the police. Under the 
slogans 'Black lives matter' and 'Hands up, 
don't shoot', people 
marched, performed flashmobs, blocked bridges 
and highways and closed 
down police stations and courthouses. One 
particular feature of the 
protests stood out. In many places across the 
country die-ins were 
staged. In these performative protests, the 
expression of public 
mourning and political action came together. 
People laid down on the 
streets in public places, blocking traffic, 
or simply occupying space 
with their bodies. High school teenagers 
performed die-ins in their 
school diners, creating piles of bodies 
between the tables. The 
die-ins made a silent, yet dramatic scene. 
They confronted passers-by 
with a performance of vulnerability, or a 
certain staged finitude. By 
collectively repeating the murder scene that 
sparked the protests, 
the performances clarified that this scene is 
not a singular 
incident, but one event in a chain of similar 
events, of numerous 
people of color lying dead in the streets. 
The countless bodies 
spread out on the pavement symbolically 
underlined the magnitude of 
the problem at stake. The die-ins brought 
together a variety of 
people, using this performance of public 
mourning to emphasize that 
black lives matter, exactly by reminding the 
public how easily these 
lives could be lost. White people took part 
in the protests out of 
solidarity without directly identifying 
themselves with victims like 
Michael Brown. This solidarity was mostly 
inspired by an 
understanding of the risk of loss, and an 
understanding of the fact 
that this risk is not equally shared, because 
of the different 
positions people have in society. 
 
Martin Crowley states that an awareness of 
the risk of loss could 
possibly spark an egalitarian revolt against 
existing injustices 
(2009). Crowley bases his analysis on Nancy's 
ontology with political 
implications. Because of the apparent 
awareness of finitude, the 
die-ins could be an illustration of the 
political agency which 
Crowley envisions. An appeal to ontological 
equality should cause an 
awareness that we do not only equally co-
appear in the world, but 
that we are also equally vulnerable to an end 
to this co-appearance, 
to a finitude of our existence (ibid., 23). 
We are exposed to this 
finitude, but cannot generally control it or 
appropriate it. 
Regardless of our background or social 
position, we share the fact 
that finitude can strike us unexpectedly and 
irrevocably. The 
awareness that we can be equally affected by 
finitude should bring 
about, in turn, a solidarity with those who 
cannot protect themselves 
from finitude, because they have lost all 
affirmative power or all 
rights to act (ibid., 124). As soon as 
finitude becomes something to 
be exercised and decided upon by some at the 
expense of others, this 
is a sign of abuse, which should be contested 
(ibid., 12). The 
deliberately differentiating of exposure to 
finitude along certain 
lines of privilege is an act of injustice 
(ibid., 24). An egalitarian 
revolt should fight such injustices in the 
name of the equally shared 
ontological status of vulnerable coexistence 
in the world. The point 
here is not to save people entirely from 
their exposure to finitude, 
but to safeguard its equal sharing. This was 
also the central claim 
of the die-ins. The actions enabled people to 
express a shared 
concern for the risk to loose ones lives by 
the hands of state 
authorities, even if this risk does not 
trouble one personally. Other 
than the protests in France, these protests 
were not focused on the 
protection of already existing freedom, but 
on the establishment of 
justice, where it is not yet equally 
established for all. 
 
6. In search of justice 
 
Where Nancy speaks of freedom as an 
'ontological imperative', which 
is always already there, he speaks of justice 
as something that needs 
to be 'rendered' (2000, 186). Justice is not 
a natural given, which 
can be easily defined or pinpointed, since it 
is intrinsically 
connected to a world which itself cannot be 
easily defined. Our world 
does not consist of a unity or an entity, but 
of an infinite process 
of sharing our existence with others. The 
world is constantly 
transformed, or constantly transforms itself 
in interaction, without 
reference to an external or transcendental 
authority. Consequentially 
a principle of absolute justice, as a certain 
general standard, does 
not exist. 'Justice does not come from the 
outside (what outside?) to 
hover above the world, in order to repair it 
or bring it to 
completion' (ibid. 189). To render justice, 
implies a recognition of 
the unique character of everything which 
exists, and simultaneously 
recognize that everything is always already 
shared and therefore 
never completely autonomous, proper, or 
untouched. It implies that 
each and everyone is equally in need of a 
just treatment, and 
simultaneously it implies that a just 
treatment in a singular case 
does not automatically signify the same in 
another case. This idea of 
justice cannot be defined in itself and can 
therefore also never be 
fully, positively realized. A need for 
justice will always exist, 
which is expressed in protests against 
injustice, and not in its own 
confirmation. These ontological reflections 
also imply that justice 
cannot always be safeguarded by institutions 
that see to the 
implementation of law and order (Nancy 2007, 
17). Sometimes laws need 
to evolve in order to establish more justice 
for more people within 
society. This is exactly what the 'Black 
lives matter' protesters ask 
for. At the same time, one should realize 
that one cannot decide on 
ones own what it means to be just, since 
justice is always 
established in relation with others (ibid. 
63). The ongoing strive 
for justice can be brought into practice if 
we first of all realize 
that everyone is in need of recognition and 
respect, for being a 
unique person, and at the same time always 
already involved in 
coexistence with others. Even though we could 
not define generally 
shared conditions for recognition, everyone 
should have an equal 
right to be recognized. This recognition 
should not be based on 
identifiable character traits, which make the 
one person more easily 
recognizable than the other. Not everyone has 
an equal lifestyle, 
needs or desires, but everyone has an equal 
right to be recognized, 
as an equally valuable human being (ibid. 41, 
42). This is why Nancy 
closely relates equality to justice. 
 
7. Shared humanity 
 
This is also why acts of political solidarity 
aimed at the 
establishment of justice do not need to be 
based on identification. 
Identification and recognition are not 
necessarily associated with 
each other. Recognition can take place on the 
basis of a very bare, 
shared humanity, in full awareness of any 
further existing 
differences. The die-ins and the 'black lives 
matter' slogan enabled 
people to collectively organize themselves 
around a shared desire for 
justice, despite the fact that they did not 
share a specific identity. 
These acts of public mourning and political 
protest are therefore not 
a performance of identity politics, but 
rather of a politics which 
emerges from a shared human vulnerability. 
They illustrate that 
traumatizing events do not need to lead to a 
reiteration of existing 
fault lines between people with a different 
religion or race. 
Expressions of public mourning can bring 
people together who share 
little else than their indignation about the 
injustices which took 
place, and nevertheless find enough 
incentives in that shared 
indignation to take action together. 
Hopefully, the mourning of 
possible future lives lost will spark such a 
solidarity based on a 
shared humanity, rather than an affirmation 
of one, dominant identity 
and its consequent exclusion of those who 
identify differently. 
 
Footnote 
 
I. See: George Yancy and Judith Butler, 
ÔWhatÕs wrong wit hall lives 
matter?Õ in: The New York Times, January 
12th, 2015, source: 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/
12/ 
whats-wrong-with-all-lives-matter/ 
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IV. AN EVENING WITH WITTGENSTEIN 
 
You are cordially invited to an Evening with 
Wittgenstein. 
 
Thursday 12th March 2015, 7.00pm 
 
Austrian Cultural Forum London 
28 Rutland Gate 
London SW7 1PQ 
 
(nearest tube station, Knightsbridge) 
 
Difficult to know and impossible to forget, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein is 
remembered as the greatest philosopher of the 
twentieth century. He 
published only one book in his lifetime -- a 
masterpiece that moulded 
the evolution of philosophy and baffled his 
teachers. The evening sees 
the launch of the play text, Wittgenstein -- 
The Crooked Roads, by 
William Lyons (Methuen-Bloomsbury Drama), and 
will also include a 
talk on the Wittgenstein family by Margaret 
Stonborough, Ludwig's 
great niece, and the first showing of a 
filmed scene from the play. 
 
William Lyons, Professor Emeritus of 
Philosophy, Trinity College, 
Dublin, has written a moving and 
philosophically acute journey 
through successive decades of Wittgenstein's 
career. The play 
received its world premiere on 19 April 2011 
at the Riverside 
Studios, London, directed by Nick Blackburn 
and generously sponsored 
by both the ACF, London, and the American 
Philosophical Association. 
 
Entry is free, as will be the refreshments. 
As space is limited, you 
will need to book -- this can be done online 
at: 
 
     
http://www.acflondon.org/booking/?event=eveni
ng-wittgenstein 
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V. JOAD EXHIBITION 
 
Two day event: Friday 10th April - Saturday 
11th April 2015 
 
Celebrating the life and work of the BBC 
Brains Trust philosopher 
C.E.M. Joad. 
 
A Joad Exhibition is planned for the 62nd 
Anniversary of the South 
Downs Philosopher C.E.M. Joad (1891-1953) 
whose Archives are in 
Arundel Museum: 
 
     http://www.the-
philosopher.co.uk/symonds.htm 
 
On Friday evening, there will be 'Brains 
Trust Evening', with 
Question Master The Reverend Roger 
Williamson. The panelists will be 
made up of volunteers and special guests. 
 
On Saturday morning there will be a 
'Ramblette', a short walk from 
Amberley Station to South Stoke Village. 
 
Richard W. Symonds 
The Joad Society 
2 Lychgate Cottages 
Ifield Street, Ifield Village 
Crawley, West Sussex 
 
Tel : 07540 309592 (Text only: I am very 
deaf) 
Email : richardsy5@aol.com (preferred 
communication) 
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VI. MIND, BODY AND SELF 
 
A three day conference: 24th-26th July 2015 
 
Call for Papers and Presentation 
 
Society for Philosophy and Culture 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
The Society for Philosophy and Culture is an 
organisation dedicated 
to promoting interest in philosophy and other 
related disciplines. 
The Society encourages cross-cultural and 
cross-disciplinary debate 
and discussion. We have branches at Victoria 
University of 
Wellington, New Zealand, and McMaster 
University, Canada. 
 
The Society is organising an international 
conference on the topic 
ÔMind, Body and SelfÕ to be held at Victoria 
University of 
Wellington, New Zealand, through the 24th-
26th of July 2015. *No 
entry fee will be required.* We are 
requesting submissions of papers 
to be presented and considered for 
publication. Papers may be 
accepted in absentia and arrangements for 
video conferencing can be 
made if attendance is not possible. 
 
The conference will present an 
interdisciplinary analysis of the main 
topic of Mind, Body and Self. Papers could be 
from disciplines such 
as: Philosophy, Sociology, Theology, 
Psychology,   Anthropology, 
Criminology, History, Geography, Cognitive 
and Neuro-Science, 
Physics, Environmental Sciences, Art History, 
Medicine, Performing 
Arts, Literature, Law, Commerce, Computer 
Science/ Artificial 
Intelligence and Eastern and Western 
Religious Perspectives. (other 
related fields may be considered) 
 
The books 
http://www.philosophyandculture.org/books.htm
l which have 
been previously compiled by The Society are 
Meaning and Identity: an 
interdisciplinary approach and Human Beings 
and Freedom: an 
interdisciplinary approach. 
 
If you are interested in submitting your 
manuscript for the book or 
in presenting at the conference, please 
contact us. Confirmation for 
presentation and/ or abstracts are due by 
28th June 2015. The final 
papers will be subject to editorial and peer-
review prior to 
publishing. Each contributor will receive a 
copy of the volume. 
 
More information can be found at the 
Society's website: 
 
     http://www.philosophyandculture.org 
 
*Please forward this email amongst those who 
would be interested or 
willing to attend this conference.* 
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